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NOTES
provide them with the practical means of securing justice?8 Al-
though poverty was once equated with "moral pestilence," 8 it is
presently held to be a constitutional irrelevance."9 If, however, it
prevents a man from effectively asserting his rights in any court of
the United States, poverty, rather than being irrelevant, becomes a
critical factor bearing upon the individual's right to retain life or
liberty.
Human error is universal. To correct this error when it results
in unjust convictions, effective appellate review is essential. Unfor-
tunately, the cost of appeal, unless that cost is paid by the state, is
prohibitive to the indigent. Steps have been taken in most states to
furnish indigents with transcripts for appeal, and to reduce appellate
costs generally. 0 But the indigent will never enjoy the "equal jus-
tice" he has been promised until he is afforded the right to counsel
on appeal. A growing awareness of the importance of effective ap-
pellate review, combined with an unwillingness to "sell" justice, prom-
ises recognition of the right to appellate counsel as essential to equal
protection of the laws.
GERALD MESSERMAN
Political Free Speech for the Union Man
INTRODUCTION
Society's eternal problem is the conflict between majority will and
individual freedom. The individual has always fought for his per-
sonal identity against the pressure of the majority. This is true
wherever there exists a relationship of one man to another. Our
Bill of Rights protects the embattled individual. It has given him
basic rights which cannot be disturbed. Free speech is the heart of
this protection. Freedom is power, and the power of the individual
rests upon his freedom to express his personal views.
Despite constitutional guarantees, the voice of the individual is
barely audible in today's powerful industrial society. He has a free-
dom of speech, but its effect is lost when he is only one of many.
87. "If it is the state's duty to prosecute and to punish proven criminals, it is equally the
state's duty to protect and to uphold the rights of all criminal defendants until the burden of
proof against them has been successfully established. Where these defendants are impoverished
or bankrupt, some provision for legal assistance in their cases must be made." Mars, Public
Defender, 46 J. CRIM. L., C. & P.S. 199, 205 (1955).
88. City of New York v. Miln, 35 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102, 143 (1837).
89. Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941).
90. See Willcox, Karlen & Roemer, Justice Lost - By What Appellate Papers Cost, 33
N.Y.U.L. REV. 934 (1958). The authors estimate that despite the reduction in the cost of ap-
pellate procedure, 76 percent of those criminal cases in which appeal is deemed desirable are
not appealed because costs are prohibitive.
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Thus, men have found a common need to unite and collectively bar-
gain for better conditions under which to live. Unions are the result
of this common need. They form the connecting link between the
concept of freedom and the concept of work. Freedom does not exist
unless someone works to obtain it. In our modern industrial society,
the individual is at a disadvantage when he works for freedom by
himself. Therefore, the unions have united men where they work, in
order to fight together for their basic rights.
In many areas labor unions have championed the cause of indi-
vidual freedom. They have reaped great benefits for their members.
At the same time, however, they have provided a new arena for the
conflict of the majority and the individual. The conflict is pointed
up in the field of political activity. Union interest in self-preserva-
tion requires a union position toward legislation affecting unions and
a union position toward the politicians who deal with this legislation.
Often, the union position comes into conflict with the feelings of an
individual member. When this takes place, there is usually a ques-
tion of whether or not the individual must give up his basic political
rights for what the union says is the common good. The answer to
this problem lies at the heart of the philosophy of democratic gov-
ernment.
PUNISHMENT FOR POLITICAL DISSENTERS
The recent California court case of Mitchell & Mulgrew v. In-
ternational Association of Machinists' upheld the expulsion by the un-
ion of three of its members who campaigned for a "right to work"
law which the union had opposed. The three men were all long
time loyal union members, and one of them, Cecil Mitchell, had been
president of his local lodge for fifteen years. However, they were
all in favor of voluntary unionism and appeared on television, made
speeches, and distributed handbills to let the people know it. The
Machinists' union called this "conduct unbecoming a member," in vio-
lation of the union constitution, 2 and the men were expelled. They
defended themselves before several union tribunals, but the expul-
sion was upheld. International Machinist's President, A. J. Hayes,
who is also National Chairman of the AFL-CIO Ethical Practices
Committee, delivered the official decision. In affirming the expul-
sion he stated in part:
While it is agreed that the right to freely express one's views is a
privilege guaranteed by the United States Constitution, this does not
mean that a member of our Association is entitled to openly denounce
the considered position of the Labor Movement and particularly his own
1. No. 730083, Cal. Super. Ct., January, 1960.
2. INT'L ASS'N oF MACHINISTS CONST. art. K, § 3 (1958).
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organization, without the possibility of losing his rights to retain his
standing as an I. A. of M. Union Member .... a
In other words, Mr. Hayes would have a member's freedom of po-
litical expression subordinated to the position of the union. He would
resolve the conflict between the majority and the individual heavily in
favor of the majority.
The judge in the Mitchell case, ruling in favor of the union, rea-
soned that the individuals had entered into a contractual relationship
with the union and that the contract required them to abide by the
union's policies. He concluded that since one policy of the union was
opposition to "right to work" laws, the contract had been violated.
This decision allows a union to control the political activities of its
members. What could be a more dear-cut violation of an individ-
ual's right of free speech?
Decisions allowing unions to expel members are usually based up-
on violations of union constitutions or by-laws. A union constitution
is the contract between member and union.' Most union constitutions
provide that a member is bound by the resolutions adopted by the
union.5 Usually, no specific mention is made of political matters, but
the language is broad enough to cover anything. However, no group
should be allowed to enforce a constitution or by-law which violates
the basic freedoms of its members. The test used by courts in judg-
ing the validity of union constitutions and by-laws is to see whether
they transgress the bounds of reason, contravene public policy, or are
contrary to the law of the land.' Therefore, contrary to the court's
reasoning in the Mitchell case, the courts will inquire into the sanctity
of union constitutions. A member is not bound by every act of his
union simply because he has signed a contract of membership. In a
democracy, every man has certain basic freedoms which no contract
nor agreement of any kind can take away.7 Freedom of speech is one
such basic freedom. Some of the constitutionally guaranteed free-
doms can be eliminated without destroying the essence of a free so-
ciety. However, if the freedoms of speech, religion, and press are
not present there is no freedom. These freedoms apply to everybody
as they live day in and day out. They are the heart of democracy.
When membership in a union is conditioned upon surrender of one of
these basic constitutional rights, public interest demands that the
court intervene to protect union members.'
3. Letter from A. J. Hayes to Officers of Int'l Ass'n of Machinists, April 29, 1959.
4. Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Harris, 260 Ky. 132, 84 S.W.2d 69 (1935); Polin v. Kaplin, 257
N.Y. 277, 177 N.E. 833 (1931); Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. Kiser, 174 Va. 229, 6
S.E.2d 562 (1940).
5. Smith v. Kern County Medical Ass'n, 19 Cal.2d 263, 120 P.2d 874 (1942).
6. Aulich v. Craigmyle, 248 Ky. 676, 59 S.W.2d 560 (1933); O'Keefe v. Local 463, 277
N.Y. 300, 14 N.E.2d 77 (1938).
7. Chavez v. Sargent, 52 Cal. 2d 162, 339 P.2d 801 (1959).
8. Cameron v. International Alliance, 118 N.J. Eq. 11, 176 At. 692 (1935).
1960]
WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
In several cases, the courts have upheld the expulsion of union
members for expressing political views contrary to those of the union,
when they did so under union titles rather than as private citizens.
Harrison v. Railway and Steamship Clerks" involved a union man
who wrote to congressmen, in his capacity as a district chairman of
the union, voicing his opposition to a proposed law which his union
was supporting. The union constitution stated that the president of
the union, in consultation with the executive committee, determines
union policy toward federal legislation when no union convention is
in session. Harrison was expelled for violating this regulation. The
court upheld the expulsion on the basis that plaintiff was not deprived
of his right of petition since he could have written to the congress-
men as a private citizen without union objection. The decision has
great merit. A union has a right to its position on an issue, just as
the individual has, and no union member should use his union title to
give the wrong impression of the position which his union has taken.
However, this case differs fundamentally from the Mitcheli case,
wherein the union denied its members the right to oppose its policy
in any fashion.
Most cases upholding union expulsion of members for dissident
political beliefs have involved legislation. However, the case of
Phoh v. Whitney' was concerned with the 1940 presidential cam-
paign between Franklin D. Roosevelt and Wendell Wilkie. The de-
cision was based upon the same principle as that in the Harrison case.
A former president of one of the Ohio lodges of the Brotherhood of
Railroad Trainmen signed a letter supporting Wilkie, when his union
had announced its support of Roosevelt. The letter was sent to all
Ohio union lodges and plaintiff used his union title with his signature.
A union regulation required any member sending out a letter for gen-
eral circulation under his union title to obtain approval from the na-
tional president. Plaintiff failed to do this, and the court refused to
interfere with the union's judgment that he should be expelled.
PROTECTION FOR UNION DISSENTERS
To authorize a court to intervene in a labor union's internal dis-
pute, three conditions usually must exist: a property right or a con-
tract right must have been violated; the act complained of must have
been in violation of the union's constitution or charter requirements;
and, in most cases, the internal remedies of the union must have been
exhausted." The courts generally have no trouble finding a property
right in labor disputes. An individual's trade is property, and mem-
bership in a union is a property right which the courts are authorized
9. 271 S.W.2d 852 (Ky. Ct. App. 1954).
10. 62 N.E.2d 744 (Ohio Ct. App. 1945); cf., Boblitt v. Cleveland C.C. & St. L. Ry., 73
Ohio App. 339, 56 N.E.2d 348 (1943).
11. Dusing v. Nuzzo, 29 N.Y.S.2d 882 (1941).
[September
NOTES
to protect.12 This protection is confined, however, to membership in
a union which has a union shop or maintenance membership agree-
ment."' Union membership is only a property right when failure to
maintain it would mean loss of employment.
Once the courts take jurisdiction, the general rule is that they will
not allow a union to take away the political freedoms of any of its
members. In Schneider v. Local Union No. 60,14 plaintiffs were
members of the United Association of Journeymen Plumbers, serv-
ing on a local board of examiners. One of the duties of the board
members was to vote for a plumbing inspector. Plaintiffs voted for
a man who did not have their union's approval. They were fined
and expelled from the union. The court overruled the expulsion, stat-
ing that this was a violation of a union member's political freedom
and of his duty to the public as a board member. Furthermore, a
union by-law forbade partisan political activity by the union, so that
the plaintiffs' failure to support the union candidate did not violate a
law of the union.
Another case involving a union constitution which said union mem-
bership is not dependent upon political belief is Morgan v. Local
1150.1" Morgan was a member of the Electrical Radio and Machine
Workers Union. During the 1942 election campaign, he handed out
Republican literature even though his union had given its support to
the Democratic New Deal candidates. The union expelled him. The
lower court overruled the expulsion because of the union regulation
outlawing partisan political activity by the union.
Often a union constitution will contain a provision forbidding a
member to interfere with the union's legislative activities. The courts
will not uphold such a regulation if it violates a man's basic freedoms.
In Abdon v. Wallace,1" plaintiff was a locomotive headlight inspector
and a member of the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers. The
union had a provision forbidding interference in its legislative activ-
ity. Plaintiff was called to testify as an expert before the Interstate
Commerce Commission in regard to a standard locomotive headlight
they were considering. The union was promoting the headlight, but
plaintiff's answers to the commission showed that he was opposed to
it. He was expelled from the union. In overruling the expulsion,
12. Lo Bianco v. Cushing, 117 N.J. Eq. 593, 177 Ad. 102 (1935).
13. Union shop agreements require all new employees to join the union within a designated
time. They must continue membership as long as the agreement is in effect or they are
automatically discharged by the employer. Maintenance membership agreements give new
employees a choice to join or not to join the union. Those that do join must maintain their
membership as long as the agreement is in effect, or lose their employment. See MATHEWS,
LABOR RELATIONS AND THE LAw 447 (1953).
14. 116 La. 270, 40 So. 700 (1905).
15. 16 L.R.R.M. 720 (111. Super. Ct 1946), revsd for failure to exhaust internal remedies,
331 IIl. App. 21, 72 NE.2d 59 (1946).
16. 95 Ind. App. 604, 165 N.E. 68 (1929).
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the court said that no union regulation can be used to instruct a wit-
ness on how to testify before a government commission and penalize
him for telling the truth.
The same rule was adopted in Spayd v. Ringling Rock Lodge. 7
Spayd was also a member of the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engi-
neers, and his activities came into conflict with the same union provi-
sion forbidding interference in legislative activities of the union.
Spayd signed a petition asking the Pennsylvania state legislature to
reconsider the "Full Crew Law," which his union had supported.
The union expelled him for violating union regulations. The court
overruled the expulsion on the ground that it violated fundamental
state constitutional rights. Its decision said in part:
The right here involved and the voting franchise, are the only means
by which peaceful changes in our laws and institutions may be brought
about, and they cannot, with safety to the state, or the whole body of the
people, be gathered into the hands of the few for any purpose whatso-
ever.
i8
UNION ASSESSMENTS FOR POLITICAL PURPOSES
The most frequent question to arise in connection with the politi-
cal rights of the union member is the authority of his union to levy a
compulsory assessment which will be used to finance a political issue
to which he may be opposed. The Labor-Management Reporting
and Disclosure Act gives a union the authority to levy special assess-
ments if, after reasonable notice, a majority of the members agree. 9
This again presents the question of where to draw the line between
the desires of the majority and individual freedom.
The classic case in this area is DeMille v. American Federation of
Radio Artists.20  Its decision is on the side of the majority. Cecil
B. DeMille received $98,200 a year to produce Lux Radio Theater.2'
In the 1944 election, a "right to work" law was submitted to the
voters of California. The local membership of the American Feder-
ation of Radio Artists, to which DeMille was forced to belong, ap-
proved an assessment of one dollar on each member to oppose the
proposed law. DeMille said he was in favor of the "right to work"
law, so he refused to pay the assessment. He was expelled from the
union on the basis of a union regulation that an assessment may be
made to oppose contemplated legislation which, in the opinion of the
members, threatens the common good of the union. Expulsion from
the union meant the loss of his $98,200 a year job.
The court held that the expulsion was not in violation of free
17. 270 Pa. 67, 113 At. 70 (1921).
18. Id. at 72, 113 Ad. at 73.
19. § 101 (3), 73 Stat. 519 (1959).
20. 31 Cal.2d 139, 187 P.2d 769 (1947), cert. denied, 333 U.S. 876 (1948).
21. 60 HARv. L. REv. 834 (1947).
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speech and should be'upheld. DeMille was not prevented from ac-
tively campaigning for the "right to work" law, nor was he told not
to vote for it. All that he was required to do was to make a contri-
bution of one dollar. Even though the money would be used for
something in which DeMille did not believe, the court ruled that he
was required to pay it as a duty of his membership. The court es-
tablished the principle that as long as a union member is free to speak
for or against an issue, no freedom is violated by a forced assess-
ment." Thus, the decision is easily distinguished from the Mitchell
case wherein the plaintiffs were denied the right to speak for or
against a "right to work" law in the same state.
The rationale of the DeMille case had been generally accepted
until the recent decision of International Association of Machinists v.
Street.23 The Supreme Court of Georgia held that the payment of
union dues and assessments as a condition of employment, when they
would be used to finance political programs with which the plaintiffs
disagree, violates the plaintiffs' freedom of speech and deprives them
of their property without due process of law. The plaintiffs were
non-union employees who were going to be forced to join a union be-
cause of a closed-shop contract between a union and their employers.
The court ruled that they did not have to join the union and could
continue their employment. The philosophy behind the court's de-
cision was that:
One who is compelled to contribute the fruits of his labor to support
or promote political or economic programs or support candidates for
public office is just as much deprived of his freedom of speech as if he
were compelled to give his vocal support to doctrines he opposes.24
This decision is directly contrary to that of the DeMille case. It is
now pending before the United States Supreme Court.25 If the de-
cision is affirmed, it will upset the system of union assessments and
give the individual union member a freedom which he has not pre-
viously enjoyed. Would such a decision give the individual too much
freedom? Although the Mitchell case goes too far in depriving the
individual of his rights, perhaps the Street case goes too far in ex-
empting the union member from the duties which he owes to his union.
CONCLUSION
A union member must have the freedom to express freely his
opinions on political issues without fear of being expelled from his
union. Free speech is one of the individual's most cherished rights,
22. Accord, Warner v. Screen Office Employees Guild, 16 L.R.R.M. 544 (Cal. Super. Ct.
1945).
23. 108 S..2d 796 (Ga. 1959).
24. Id. at 808.
25. International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, appeal docketed, No. 258, U.S. Oct. 1959
Term.
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and no majority, no matter how powerful, should be allowed to take
it away from him. No union agreement should be upheld when it
requires a man to sign away his free speech and political views as a
condition to earning a living. The United States Supreme Court has
said that the freedom to advocate ideas is the first amendment's basic
guarantee, a guarantee which is not confined to the opinions of the
majority.26 In Sweezy v. New Hampshire,7 the Court stated that
the very foundation of our government is the premise that every citi-
zen has the right to engage freely in political expression and associa-
tion.
For the most part, the courts have upheld the individual union
man's freedom of political expression and association. The assess-
ment cases do not deny free speech, since the union member may
campaign as he wishes even though he must contribute financially to
a cause he opposes. However, with controversies over "right to
work" laws raging in many states, decisions such as the Mitchell case
should be quickly overruled. When a union feels that it is threatened
by proposed legislation, it should not be allowed to use the weapon of
expulsion to tell its members how to speak and how to vote. This is
not liberty. It is a forced conformance to the majority in order to
survive. If a union were allowed to demand a member's opposition
to "right to work" laws, perhaps it would also be allowed to demand
his opposition to any labor reform measure, such as the recent
Landrum-Griffin Bill? From there it is just one short step to ex-
pelling men who support candidates who advocate such laws. The
issue before us is fundamental to our democratic society. Our coun-
try is founded upon free speech, and no group should have the power
to deny it. Mr. Justice Jackson aptly stated this fundamental democrat-
ic principle in West [lirginia State Board of Education v. Barnette:-
The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain sub-
jects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond
the reach of majorities and officials .... 80
If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that
no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics,
nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to
confess by word or act their faith therein.3
PHILLIP ALLYN RANNEY
26. Kingsley Int'l Pictures v. Regents, 360 U.S. 684 (1959).
27. 354 U.S. 234 (1957).
28. Labor-Management Reporting & Disclosure Act of 1959, 73 Star. 519 (codified in scat-
tered sections of 29 U.S.C.A.).
29. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
30. Id. at 638.
31. Id. at 642.
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